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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Kay has appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment, quieting title in 
appellee EBF to a parcel of real property located in Juab County, Utah. EBF was granted 
summary judgment pursuant to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. In its ruling, 
the district court concluded that the burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases is 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof by clear and convincing 
evidence. Although the district court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard was the proper standard, it nevertheless evaluated EBF's claims under the higher 
standard of clear and convincing evidence, and concluded that EBF had established a 
boundary by acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the district 
court granted EBF summary judgment and denied Kay's cross motion for partial 
summary judgment. 
Issue for Review: Did the district court err in concluding that the burden of proof 
in boundary by acquiescence cases is proof by a preponderance of the evidence? 
Standard of Review: De novo. "Burden of proof questions typically present 
issues of law that an appellate court reviews for correctness." Martinez v. Media-
Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, f 41, 164 P.3d 384. 
Issue for Review: If boundary by acquiescence claims must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence, did the district court err in granting EBF summary 
judgment, concluding that the element of "mutual acquiescence" was established by clear 
and convincing evidence? 
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Standard for Review: De novo. "We review a district court's decision to grant 
summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to the district court. Our review 
is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the summary 
judgment standard in light of the undisputed material facts." Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 
UT61,110,221P.3d219. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter involves a dispute over a piece of real property between adjoining 
landowners which is located in Juab County, Utah. At issue is a claim of boundary by 
acquiescence by EBF. For over forty years, the parties' predecessors in interest and their 
families treated an old barbed-wire fence as the boundary between their respective 
properties located near Mona, Utah. The families conducted all of their respective 
farming and cattle operations within the boundary of the old fence. The parcel at issue is 
approximately six acres in size and is narrow and triangular in shape. EBF's 
predecessors have occupied the disputed parcel up to the fence line marking the boundary 
between the properties for over forty years. 
On May 26, 2005, EBF filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
Juab County, seeking to quiet title in the disputed property and also claiming trespass 
against Kay. (R. 1-5). On or about September 17, 2007, EBF filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment along with a supporting memorandum, seeking a judgment and 
decree of quiet title in the disputed property. (R. 82-241). On October 25, 2007, Kay 
filed a cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 260-261). After briefing was complete, 
the district court heard oral arguments on March 13, 2008. (R. 411). On May 13, 2008, 
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the district court issued a written Ruling and Order, ruling in favor of EBF. (R. 413-437). 
On June 26, 2008, the district court entered its Order on Cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment and Defendant Steven L. Kay's Motion to Strike. (R. 440-451). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The location of the original fence at issue in this action (the "Original 
Fence") is reflected on a survey prepared by Ludlow Engineering and Land Surveying, 
signed on August 9, 2004 (the "Survey"). (R. 78, 211, 239). 
2. The Survey accurately reflects the locations of fence lines that existed on 
the various properties at the time the Survey was conducted. (R. 78-81, 239). 
3. EBF holds the fee-title ownership interest in certain real property located 
near Mona, Juab County, Utah, described in that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded 
on March 13, 1998, as Entry No. 00212715, in Book 0391, at Page 0181 (the "EBF 
Property"). (R. 204-209, 238). 
4. Kay holds the fee-title ownership interest in certain real properly located 
near Mona, Juab County, Utah, described in that certain Warranty Deed recorded on June 
20, 2004, as Entry No. 00235619, in Book 0466, at Page 0641 (the "Kay Property"). (R. 
202,238). 
5. Kay's predecessor-in-title received a patent to Kay's land from the United 
States in 1905. (R. 266-267, 297). 
6. EBF's predecessor-in-title received a patent to EBF's land from the United 
States in 1905. (R. 263-264, 297). 
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7. Through mesne conveyances, EBF's property was conveyed to EBF in 
1998. (R. 235-236). 
8. Through mesne conveyances, Kay's property was conveyed to Kay in 
2004. (R. 237-238). 
9. John L. Fowkes, a prior owner of the Kay Property, died on December 14, 
1957. (R. 333,348). 
10. The Kay Property was conveyed on or about November 23, 1959 by L. Earl 
Fowkes, the administrator of the Estate of John L. Fowkes, to Maud Fowkes. (R. 193-
198,238). 
11. Maud Fowkes died on July 9, 1965. (R. 329-331, 348). 
12. The Kay Property was conveyed by Maud Fowkes to Blanch Fowkes 
Cloward (a dauther of John and Maud Fowkes) pursuant to a Declaration and Deed of 
Trust (R. 189-191,237). 
13. Blanch F. Cloward died on Ocotber 9, 1990. (R. 327, 348). 
14. On February 24, 1970, a Deed of Conveyance was recorded to convey the 
Kay Property from Blanch F. Cloward to her sister, Olive F. Stanley, and Olive's 
husband, Daryl H. Stanley. The Deed of Conveyance to the Stanleys did not include the 
adjoining, triangular parcel to the west, which is now known as XB1433-21. (R. 187, 
237). 
15. On May 22, 1995, the Kay Property was conveyed by Olive F. Stanley and 
Daryl H. Stanley to Daryl H. Stanley and Olive F. Stanley, as trustees of the Stanley 
Family Trust, u/a/d May 8, 1995. (R. 185, 237). 
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16. On June 30, 2004, Olive F. Stanley and Daryl H. Stanley, as trustees of the 
Stanley Family Trust, u/a/d May 8, 1995, conveyed the Kay Property to Kay pursuant to 
a Warranty Deed. (R. 202, 237). 
17. Daryl H. Stanley died on July 3, 2005. (R. 325, 348). 
18. Tom Fowkes is the son of Earl and Darlene Fowkes and the grandson of 
John L. Fowkes, a prior owner of the Kay Property. (R. 155, 235). 
19. Tom Fowkes, who was born in 1947, testified that he has lived at his 
family's home near Mona, Utah, for "just about 59 years," except for a short period of 
time when the family lived in town. (R. 155, 158, 235). 
20. Earl Fowkes, Tom's father, passed away several years ago, but Darlene 
Fowkes still lives in Mona. (R. 155, 235). 
21. Earl Fowkes started farming his family's property before 1947. (R. 150, 
235). 
22. Earl Fowkes had three siblings: Olive, Blanche, and Lucille, none of whom 
participated in farming activities on the family property. Olive Stanley is the only 
remaining living sister of Earl Fowkes. (R. 150, 155, 235). 
23. The Fowkes family dry farmed their side of the Original Fence. (R. 156, 
234). 
24. Tom Fowkes began farming his family's property when he icwas big 
enough to go" with his father. (R. 156, 234). 
25. During the brief time that the Fowkes family lived in the town of Mona, 
Tom Fowkes continued to work on the family farm. (R. 154, 234). 
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26. Tom Fowkes farmed his family's property from his childhood until "[u]p 
into the '70s, I would assume, maybe even later than that." (R. 152, 234). 
27. The Fowkes family continued farming activities on their property until it 
was sold to Kay. (R. 152-153, 234). 
28. Regarding the boundary between the properties at issue, Tom Fowkes 
testified as follows: 
Q: All right. . . . Looking again at this survey, just based on 
your experience with the property and working on the farm, 
where did you understand the boundary to be between the 
properties we've been talking about? 
A: On the fenceline. 
(R. 154,234). 
29. The Original Fence was in existence when Tom Fowkes was born. (R. 153, 
233). 
30. Tom Fowkes further testified that his family maintained the Original Fence 
on occasion. (R. 147, 233). 
31. Tom Fowkes also had dealings with the Andrews family, the prior owners 
of the EBF property, "as long as they were here." (R. 152, 233, 235-236). 
32. Dale Fowkes, Tom Fowkes' brother, conducted farming activities on the 
family property until it was sold to Kay. (R. 138, 233). 
33. Dale Fowkes testified that his family dry farmed their property, rotating hay 
and grain, with "the exception of once in awhile" when they were able to "get the water 
to come across." These farming activities continued until the year 2001. (R. 136, 233). 
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34. In earlier years, the Fowkes family ran livestock on their property. (R. 
35. Dale Fowkes farmed the family property under a lease from Daryl and 
Olive Stanley for about ten years before the property was sold to Kay. (R. 140-141, 233). 
36. Dale Fowkes testified that the Original Fence was in existence when he was 
born in 1949. (R. 139,233). 
37. Regarding his contact with the Andrews family and the boundary between 
the properties, Dale Fowkes testified as follows: 
Q: How much contact did you have with the - the Andrews? 
A: Quite a bit. 
Q: What kinds of - what kinds of contact would you have 
with the Andrews as you were— 
A: Oh-
Q: —working on the farm? 
A: Oh, we traded machinery back and forth, you know, 
talked - talked fairly often. I did work for them and they 
come and helped me at different times, you know? It's just a 
- a neighborly situation. 
Q: And what kind of work did you do for the Andrews? 
A: Oh, I baled hay for them, trucked, cleaned ground for 
them. And, like I say, we traded machinery back and forth at 
different times. And then just - just kind of a social thing, 
you know, just as neighbors talk back and forth about 
different things. When I was younger I worked for them, you 
know, when I was coming through school and things like that. 
Q: What did the Andrews do with their side of the - the 
property or their side of the fence line? 
A: When I was younger that - they - they planted some -
they did a little dry land work up there but that really wasn't 
their thing, so they planted the grass and run livestock in 
there. 
Q: Okay. Based on your experience with the - the property 
that we've been talking about and you've testified today what 
was your understanding where the boundary was between 
your family's property and the Andrews property? 
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A: The - fence - where the fence was. 
Q: Did you ever speak with anyone in the Andrews family or 
others who owned that property to the east about the 
boundary? 
A: No. 
Q: Were there ever any disputes about where the boundary 
was between the two properties? 
A: Not that I'm aware of. 
(R. 139,232-233). 
38. Eldon Verness Andrews ("Vemess Andrews") was one of the prior owners 
of the EBF property. (R. 236). 
39. Pursuant to a Warranty Deed, the Andrews family conveyed title to the 
North Vi of the Southeast lA of Section 4 to Vemess Andrews. (R. 170-173, 231). 
40. Vemess Andrews was involved with his family's business operations on the 
Andrews property from the time it was purchased in 1955 until it was sold to EBF in 
1998. (R. 121,231). 
41. Vemess Andrews testified that initially the family dry farmed the property 
for about six or seven years beginning in 1955 or 1956. (R. 126, 230). 
42. After the Andrews family dry farmed their property for a period of time, 
they began to run livestock on their property. Vemess Andrews testified as follows: 
Q: Were you involved with the cattle operation for the 
duration of the time your family owned the property? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And just so I understand that cattle operation, then 
occurred on . . . occurred to the east of the fenceline. Is that 
correct? 
A: Yes. 
(R. 126, 229-230). 
R 
43. Verness Andrews testified regarding the Original Fence as follows: 
Q: Was the fence there when your family bought the 
property? 
A: Yes, it was there. It'd been there for quite a few years. 
Q: Do you know what the owners to the west of the fence did 
with their property? 
A: Well, they, they farmed most of it. 
Q: What kind of farming would they do? 
A: Well, they had hay and some grain. 
Q: How often did you come in contact with the owners on 
the west side of the fence? 
A: Oh, probably daily. I mean, we were neighbours. We, we 
were out working the fields, you know, at the same time. 
(R. 126, 229). 
44. Regarding the boundaries between the properties, Vemess Andrews 
testified as follows: 
Q: Did you ever have any discussions with the Fowkes 
family there on the west of the fence about where the 
boundary was between the properties? 
A: Not that I know of, no. 
Q: Were there ever any disputes about where the boundary 
was? 
A: No. 
Q: What was your understanding of where the boundary was 
between the properties? 
A: Where, where the fence went. Where it originally was. 
(R. 125, 228-229). 
45. Vemess Andrews also testified that when they began their livestock 
operation on the property, the Andrews family had to improve the condition of the fence 
because some of the fence was old and had rusty wire. (R. 126, 228). 
46. Referring to a couple of occasions when some wayward cows were able to get 
through the fence separating the properties, Vemess Andrews testified as follows: 
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There was no dispute about the boundary. The fence was the 
boundary. They, they didn't say, ;You got to move your 
fence' or anything else. They said, 'Your cows are on my 
property.' 
(R. 124, 228). 
47. According to Verness Andrews, the Fowkes family farmed on their side of 
the Original Fence, the Andrews family operated on their side, "[a]nd the existing fence 
as we understood it was the boundary line - property line." (R. 124, 228). 
48. Vemess Andrews also testified regarding the boundary between the 
properties as follows: 
Q:. . . . I'm asking if- whether there was a discussion, if there 
was - if people talked about the fenceline. 
A: Not to my knowledge. We just accepted that as the 
boundary line. 
*** 
Q: Okay. You understood that the fence was the boundary. 
Correct? 
A: Yes, we operated as such. 
(R. 121, 123-124,227-228). 
49. Vemess Andrews further testified that, based on the way the Original Fence 
was constructed with what he called "pioneer barbed wire," he believed the Original 
Fence "could have been there thirty, forty years before we came" in 1955. (R. 123, 227). 
50. Delos Andrews, brother of Vemess Andrews participated in the family's 
ranch operations from 1971 until the Andrews family sold the EBF Property to EBF in 
1998. (R. 114-115, 227). 
51. Delos Andrews testified that the Andrews family used their side of the 
Original Fence for grazing activities. (R. 115, 227). 
10 
52. Delos Andrews testified that the Original Fence "was there when we came 
in . . . the spring of '55, and I suppose it had been there for I'd suspect another 50 years 
beyond that. But I have no idea." (R. 108, 226). 
53. According to Delos Andrews, during the time the Andrews family owned 
their property, the Original Fence was always visible. (R. 115, 226). 
54. Delos Andrews farther testified that the Fowkes family would farm their 
land right up to the fence line, and the Andrews family would have their livestock graze 
up to the fence line. (R. 115, 226). 
55. With respect to the boundary between the properties, Delos Andrews 
testified as follows: 
Q: Did you ever have any discussion with the property 
owners to the west of the fence line about the fence as the 
boundary of the property or between the - the two properties? 
A: I never recall ever having a conversation about the fence 
line that's - in any regard. 
Q: Did you understand that the fence was the boundary 
between the two properties? 
A: Yes. 
Q: I'm talking - I'm referring to the old fence. 
A: Yes, I understand that the fence line was the property line 
and [] established the ownership. 
(R. 114,225-226). 
56. Delos Andrews further testified that there was "never a dispute about the 
fence" as being the boundary between the properties. (R. 104, 225). 
57. Delos Andrews also testified that the Fowkes family never acted in a 
manner inconsistent with the Original Fence being the boundary between the properties. 
(R. 114,225). 
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58. Oral C. Taylor was also one of the prior owners of EBF Property, and is a 
brother-in-law of Verness Andrews and Delos Andrews. (R. 114, 225). 
59. Oral Taylor was involved with the Andrews family business operations on 
the EBF Property from the time it was purchased in 1955 until it was sold to EBF in 
1998, although he had less frequent involvement in the business after suffering a heart 
attack in about 1977. (R. 96-97, 225). 
60. Regarding the boundary between the properties, Mr. Taylor testified as 
follows: 
Q:. . . . What, what was your understanding, generally where 
the boundary was between your family's property and the 
Fowkes' property? 
A: This whole fenceline that was there when we bought the 
place. It was right there - it was there. As far as I know, that 
was original fence. 
Q: Do you know when the fence was built? 
A: I have no idea. It was long before my time. 
(R. 93, 223-224). 
61. Sometime after purchasing the Kay Property in 2004, Kay removed 
portions of the Original Fence, and constructed a new fence located to the east of the 
Original Fence, enclosing approximately six (6) acres of the EBF Property. (R. 88-89, 
223, 467). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The district court correctly concluded that the burden of proof in 
establishing boundary by acquiescence is by a preponderance of the evidence. Although 
Kay argues that the standard of proof required is clear and convincing evidence, he has 
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not identified any Utah case law in support of his position. EBF, however, has identified 
a prior Utah Supreme Court decision which directly indicates that a claim for boundary 
by acquiescence is established by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, two Utah 
appellate court decisions contain dicta which indicate that Utah courts apply the 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. As discussed herein, proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence satisfies the due process requirements of Utah 
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. The other legal doctrines referenced by Kay 
which employ the clear and convincing standard of proof are readily distinguishable from 
claims of boundary by acquiescence, and the district court did not err in refusing to adopt 
the higher standard of proof advocated by Kay. 
II. Although the district court ruled that the correct standard of proof for 
boundary by acquiescence cases is the preponderance of the evidence standard, the 
district court nevertheless analyzed EBF's claims under the clear and convincing 
evidence standard and concluded that EBF was entitled to summary judgment on its quiet 
title action based on boundary by acquiescence. Therefore, even if this Court is 
persuaded that boundary by acquiescence claims require proof of clear and convincing 
evidence, the district court should be affirmed because it analyzed the claims under this 
more rigorous standard of proof. Furthermore, the only element of boundary by 
acquiescence which is at issue on this appeal is the element of "mutual acquiescence." 
Kay does not dispute on appeal that the parties are adjoining landowners, that there was 
occupation up to a visible line marked by the Original Fence, and that the Original Fence 
has been in existence for a period of time greater than twenty years. In ruling in favor of 
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EBF, the district court followed Utah precedent and found that the facts presented by this 
case established by clear and convincing evidence that the parties had mutually 
acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary between the two properties. 
III. For the first time, Kay has raised arguments regarding the law of 
abandonment of easements which were never raised before the trial court. Because these 
arguments were never raised by Kay at the trial level nor were they ever considered by 
the district court, Kay has not preserved this issue for appeal and these arguments should 
not be considered by this Court. However, even if the Court were to consider this new 
argument, the law of abandonment of easements is distinguishable from boundary by 
acquiescence claims and is therefore inapplicable to this appeal. 
IV. Because the district court properly ruled in favor of EBF by finding that a 
boundary by acquiescence was established by clear and convincing evidence, the district 
court did not err in denying Kay's cross motion for summary judgment, by which Kay 
sought a decree that a boundary by acquiescence had not been created. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The district court correctly concluded that the burden of proof in 
establishing boundary by acquiescence is by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
a. Absent an indication to the contrary, the presumed standard of 
proof in civil cases is a preponderance of the evidence. 
This Court has held that "the standard of proof generally applied in civil 
proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence standard." Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 
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931, 934 (Utah 1998) (citing Johns v. Shulsen, 111 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 19Z6); Lipman 
v. Industrial Comm }n, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979); Morris v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. 
Co., 500 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1972); Barken v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d 
1176, 1182 (Utah 1996) (holding that "proper standard of proof in the administrative 
context is generally the 'preponderance of the evidence standard' absent 'allegation of 
fraud or a statute or a court rule requiring a higher standard.'") (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
In Johns, this Court noted that "[i]t is universally recognized that the standard of 
proof in civil actions is by a preponderance of the evidence." Johns, 111 P.2d at 1338 
(citing Morris, 500 P.2d at 507). Although Kay argues that the standard of proof to 
establish boundary by acquiescence is actually clear and convincing evidence, he has not 
identified a statute or a court rule requiring the higher standard of proof which he 
advocates is the proper standard. In the absence of a contrary indication requiring a 
higher standard of proof, Utah courts deciding civil matters apply the preponderance of 
the evidence standard. Accordingly, the district court was correct in ruling that a 
boundary by acquiescence under Utah law must be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
b. This Court has already held that a boundary by acquiescence is 
established by a preponderance of the evidence and, as such, the 
doctrine of stare decisis is applicable to this appeal. 
The elements of a claim for boundary by acquiescence are well-settled. In RHN 
Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 23, 96 P.3d 935, 941, this Court stated as follows: 
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"The elements of boundary by acquiescence are (i) 
occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, 
or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining 
landowners." 
RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT, \ 23, 96 P.3d 935, 941 (quoting Jacobs v. Hafen, 
917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)). 
The requirement that a boundary line must have been in existence "for a long 
period of time" has been interpreted to mean a period of not less than twenty years. See_ 
Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 795 (Utah 1975); see_ also Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990). At issue on this appeal is whether the above-
recited elements must be established by a preponderance of the evidence or whether the 
higher standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence is required. 
Utah courts have held that a party attempting to establish a boundary by 
acquiescence bears the burden of establishing mutual acquiescence in the property line. 
See e.g. Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f 18, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002); see also Brown v. 
Jorgensen, 2006 UT App. 168, f 14, 136 P.3d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). Kay 
argues that "the burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases must be proof by 
clear and convincing evidence." Appellant Brief, pg. 12. This position, however, is 
directly contradicted by this Court's holding in Elias v. Lea, 1978 Utah LEXIS 1129, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 to EBF's Addendum. 
In addition to these four elements, a fifth element referred to as the "objective 
uncertainty requirement" was formerly necessary to establish a claim of boundary by 
acquiescence. See Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). Halladay was overruled 
by this Court's ruling in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 424 (Utah 1990), thereby 
eliminating this fifth element. 
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In Elias, this Court considered a claim of boundary by acquiescence, ultimately 
holding that the appellants had "failed in their proof of acquiescence in the fence as a 
boundary." Id. at | 3. This decision was based on the finding that there was no proof 
"that the respondent or any of his predecessors in interest ever had any knowledge that 
the property east of the fence was being claimed by another." Id. Significantly, in 
connection with its discussion of the appellant's burden in establishing a boundary by 
acquiescence, the Court held as follows: 
[T]he following elements are established by a preponderance 
of the evidence: 
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely 
by some monument, 
(2) Acquies[c]ence in that line as a boundary 
(a) by adjoining land owners, and 
(b) for a long period of time. 
Id at If 2-3. 
This rule stated in Elias confirms that this Court applies the preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases. Consistent with Elias, 
two Utah Court of Appeals decisions contain dicta indicating that a boundary by 
acquiescence is established by a preponderance of the evidence. In Gillmor v. 
Cummings, 904 P.2d 703 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals considered a 
claim of boundary by acquiescence. In considering the claim of boundary by 
acquiescence, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that a boundary by 
acquiescence had not been established because there was evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that the claimant "failed to show a permanent definite boundary line 
existed for 20 years or more." Gillmor, 904 P.2d at 707. Gillmor then concluded that it 
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found "sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Cummings failed to 
show by a preponderance of evidence that he had established a new boundary by 
acquiescence." Id. This express reference to "a preponderance of evidence" as the 
standard of proof required in establishing a boundary by acquiescence in reality merely 
states the standard Utah courts have always employed. 
Even more recently, in a 2009 decision, the Utah Court of Appeals considered a 
claim of boundary by acquiescence and affirmed the trial court's legal conclusion that 
"Pitt failed to prove 'by a preponderance of the evidence that the landowners occupied 
the land up to a visible line for a complete period of 20 years.'" Pitt v. Taron, 2009 UT 
App. 113, Tf 2, 210 P.3d 962. This holding again confirms that Utah appellate courts 
apply the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in deciding boundary by 
acquiescence claims. 
In contrast to the Utah authority cited herein which confirms the preponderance of 
the evidence standard as the appropriate standard of proof, Kay has failed to identify a 
single reported boundary by acquiescence case in this state which identifies clear and 
convincing evidence as the standard of proof required. If a higher standard of proof were 
required in establishing the elements of boundary by acquiescence, it is reasonable to 
assume that this Court would have articulated "clear and convincing evidence" as the 
appropriate standard of proof in one of the many previously reported decisions addressing 
boundary by acquiescence claims spanning the last century. 
Because Utah appellate courts apply the preponderance of the evidence standard 
of proof, EBF urges this Court to follow the doctrine of stare decisis, and not depart from 
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the standard of proof stated by this Court in Elias. In advocating clear and convincing 
evidence as the standard to be employed, Kay is in fact asking this Court to overturn prior 
precedent. This Court has held that "[t]hose asking us to overturn prior precedent have a 
substantial burden of persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare 
decisis." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (internal citation omitted), 
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115. Regarding the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court has stated 
as follows: 
This doctrine, under which the first decision by a court on a 
particular question of law governs later decisions by the same 
court, is a cornerstone of the Anglo-American jurisprudence 
that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness 
of adjudication. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 
(Utah 1993)). 
When following precedent, this Court has stated: 
The general American doctrine as applied to courts of last 
resort is that a court is not inexorably bound by its own 
precedents but will follow the rule which it has established in 
earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come 
by departing from precedent. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 (quoting John Hanna, The Role of 
Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 367, 367 (1957)). 
While EBF recognizes that this Court is not "inexorably bound" by its prior 
decisions, the conditions which would justify a departure from the preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof are not present here. There is simply no evidence that 
conditions with respect to boundary by acquiescence claims have changed in recent 
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years, thereby making the preponderance of the evidence standard no longer sound. 
Likewise, there is no evidence that the rule stated in Elias was originally erroneous, or 
that more good than harm will result by departing from precedent. Instead, the standard 
of proof required in boundary by acquiescence actions has by and large been a non-issue, 
as evidenced by the extensive Utah case law addressing boundary by acquiescence claims 
which has not even discussed the required burden of proof. Accordingly, this Court 
should reaffirm that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof referenced in 
Elias is the correct standard of proof in establishing a claim of boundary by acquiescence. 
c. Although reported cases from other jurisdictions do not uniformly 
follow the same standard of proof in establishing boundary by 
acquiescence claims, the better-reasoned decisions adhere to the 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. 
In its Ruling and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and Steven L. 
Kay's Motion to Strike ("Ruling and Order"), the district court correctly noted that other 
jurisdictions do not uniformly adhere to the same standard of proof in establishing claims 
of boundary by acquiescence. See Ruling and Order, pgs. 17-18. (R. 420-421). Powell 
on Real Property states as follows: 
Whether there has been recognition and acquiescence is a 
question of fact in which the burden of proof rests on the 
person relying on the doctrine. Indeed, several states require 
that the claimant prove recognition and acquiescence by clear 
and convincing evidence or some closely allied standard, 
although other courts require only a fair preponderance of the 
evidence. 
9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68.05[8] (Michael Allan Wolfed., 
LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2007). 
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Case law from Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, 
and Washington are cited by the Powell treatise as adhering to the clear and convincing 
standard of proof See_ id. Other jurisdictions, however, have explained the propriety of 
employing a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. 
In Walters v. Snyder, 570 N.W.2d 301, 302 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), the Michigan 
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court which had required that a claim 
for boundary by acquiescence be established by "clear and positive proof rather than by 
a preponderance of the evidence. Walters specifically held that "the proper standard 
applicable to a claim of acquiescence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence." 
Walters, 570 N.W.2d at 303. The court reasoned that "application of the higher standard 
of proof seems inappropriate to an acquiescence claim" because, unlike a claim for 
adverse possession, "[a] claim of acquiescence does not require that the possession be 
hostile or without permission." Id. Michigan appellate courts continue to apply the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, as evidenced by a 2009 unpublished decision 
wherein the appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding of a claim in favor of 
boundary by acquiescence which, in accordance with Walters, was established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See. Crosby v. Post, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2411, ^ 4 
(unpublished). 
2
 The cases cited are Tewes v. Pine Lane Farms, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 1994); Dart 
v. Thompson, 154 N.W.2d 82 (Iowa 1967); Crosby v. Baizley, 642 A.2d 150 (Me. 1994); 
Davis v. Mitchell, 628 A.2d 657 (Me. 1993); Marja Corp. v. Allain, 622 A.2d 1182 (Me. 
1993); Taylor v. Hanson, 541 A.2d 155 (Me. 1988); Calthorpe v. Abrahamson, 441 A.2d 
284 (Me. 1982); Wojakn v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1980); Mam v. Bohara, 
367 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1985); Lien v. Beard, 478 N.W.2d 578 (S.D. 1991); Heath v. 
Dudley, 530 A.2d 151 (Vt. 1987); Lilly v. Lynch, 945 P.2d 727 (Wash. App. 1997). 
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Arkansas courts also apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to claims of 
boundary by acquiescence. In Mann v. Hughes, 502 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ark. 1973), the 
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding "from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the boundary had been fixed by common consent and acquiescence." In 
affirming the chancery court's finding in favor of a claim for boundary by acquiescence, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the testimony was conflicting and "created a 
close question of fact." Mann, 502 S.W.2d at 467. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the 
chancery court's finding, noting that ";[w]hen the evidence is conflicting or evenly 
poised, or nearly so, the judgment of the chancellor on the question of where the 
preponderance of the evidence lies is considered as persuasive.'" Id. (quoting Clark v. 
Mathis, 486 S.W.2d 77 (Ark. 1972)). 
As noted in the Powell treatise, "[a]mong the reasons given for the clear and 
convincing standard are (1) to discourage aggressive, assertive action inconsistent with 
good neighborliness, (2) to avoid a flood of litigation, and (3) to narrowly tailor a 
doctrine that transfers title to property without compliance with the statute of fraud." 9 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68.05[8]. These factors, however, are not persuasive for 
the very reasons given by the district court in this case. In its Ruling and Order, the 
district court explained why it was unpersuaded that the clear and convincing standard of 
proof should be applied in Utah: 
First, the clear and convincing standard seems equally or 
more likely than the preponderance standard to promote 
aggressive behavior inconsistent with good neighborliness. 
True, it seems that one is less likely, ex ante, to attempt to 
establish an incorrect boundary when he knows he would be 
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required, twenty years later, to prove acquiescence by clear 
and convincing evidence as opposed to a preponderance of 
the evidence. On the other hand, however, a recent grantee of 
property is less likely to disturb a longstanding boundary if he 
knows prior acquiescence may be proven by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence. For similar reasons, it is not 
clear that a preponderance standard would engender more 
litigation than a clear and convincing standard. Finally, a 
doctrine that permits transfer of ownership in contradiction of 
record boundaries and without compliance with the statute of 
frauds should be appropriately narrowed. But as noted above, 
the doctrine itself is "already a restrictive doctrine," Veibell, 
2004 UT P 29, and the Utah Supreme Court has expressed 
reluctance to "unduly restrict" it. Id. P 28. 
Ruling and Order, pg. 18. (R. 420). 
The required elements of boundary by acquiescence under Utah law, as governed 
by the preponderance of the evidence standard, are sufficient to protect owners with 
deeded property interests. As this Court has noted in Stoker, "boundary by acquiescence 
has always been restrictively applied in Utah." Staker, 785 P.2d at 423. For instance, 
Utah courts strictly enforce the twenty-year acquiescence requirement. See, e.g., Jacobs, 
917 P.2d at 1081 (concluding that 18 Vi -year period was insufficient for acquiescence). 
Because boundary by acquiescence has always been restrictively applied by Utah courts, 
there is no need to adopt a higher standard of proof to further restrict what is already a 
restrictive doctrine. Under Utah law, property owners are sufficiently protected by the 
required elements of boundary by acquiescence. Therefore, this Court should decline to 
adopt the clear and convincing evidence standard advocated by Kay in this matter. 
d. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence in satisfaction of the 
elements required for a claim of boundary by acquiescence 
pursuant to Utah law does not offend the Due Process Clauses of the 
Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution. 
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Kay argues that the Due Process Clauses of the Utah Constitution and the United 
States Constitution require that boundary by acquiescence claims be established by clear 
and convincing evidence. While EBF agrees that both the Utah Constitution and the 
United States Constitution protect real property owners against the deprivation of their 
property rights , not every alteration of a property owner's rights must be established by 
the standard of proof advocated by Kay in this action. Indeed, Kay has failed to identify 
any authority to support the argument that a finding of boundary by acquiescence by a 
preponderance of the evidence offends the requirements of due process. Significantly, 
the cases relied upon by Kay in support of his due process arguments, i.e., Egbert v. 
Nissan N Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, 167 P.3d 1058 and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 
99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed.2d 323 (1979), do not address the standard of proof required in 
cases involving the alteration of real property rights. 
In Egbert, this Court discussed the varying standards of proof, and noted that the 
United States Supreme Court has applied the clear and convincing standard of proof "in 
cases involving civil commitment, deportation, and denaturalization." Egbert, \61 P.3d 
at 1062 (citations omitted). Egbert also noted that the Utah Supreme Court had 
previously held the clear and convincing standard of proof as the appropriate standard for 
rebutting the '"presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children"5 
because the "'presumption deals with parental liberty interests.'" Id. (quoting Uzelac v. 
3
 See Utah Const. Art. I § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law,"); See_ also United States Const. Amend. XIV ("No state 
shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. . . ."). 
24 
Thurgood (In re Estate o/S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, fflf 27-28, 144 P.3d 1083). However, 
neither Addington nor Egbert even address the standard of proof required to satisfy due 
process in a claim involving real property rights. 
As EBF has already noted herein, this Court already treats boundary by 
acquiescence claims as a "restrictive doctrine" and requires that each of the necessary 
elements be met. See, Staker, 785 P.2d at 423; See. also Veibell, 2004 UT at If 29. 
Evidence of the restrictive application of the boundary by acquiescence doctrine is 
illustrated by the requirement under Utah law that the mutual acquiescence in the 
boundary be established for a period of at least twenty years. Proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence establishing the mutual acquiescence in an observable boundary by 
adjoining landowners for such a long period time clearly satisfies the requirements of due 
process in altering an owner's real property rights. Given the restrictive application of 
boundary by acquiescence under Utah law, Kay's argument that due process requires 
boundary by acquiescence claims to be established by clear and convincing evidence is 
without merit and should be rejected by this Court. 
e. Because other legal doctrines referenced by Kay which govern the 
alteration of real property rights are readily distinguishable from 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the district court did not 
err in refusing to adopt the clear and convincing standard of proof. 
Kay argues that boundary by acquiescence claims require proof by clear and 
convincing evidence because certain other legal doctrines governing the alteration of 
property rights also apply the heightened standard of proof. See Appellant's Brief, pgs. 
12-15. Specifically, Kay argues that proof by clear and convincing evidence is required 
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because Utah courts require clear and convincing evidence in cases involving public 
dedication of land for use as a road or highway4, prescriptive easements5, deed 
cancelation or reformation , and adverse possession founded on parol gifts. These 
arguments were considered by the district court and were properly rejected, with the 
district court noting that Kay "overlooks what may be [] significant distinctions between 
the above doctrines and boundary by acquiescence." Ruling and Order, pg. 16. 
Claims involving the transfer of private land for public use are readily 
distinguishable because "boundary by acquiescence cannot be established when one of 
the adjoining tracts of land is part of the public domain." Carter v. Hanrath, 925 P.2d 
960, 962 (Utah 1996). Because boundary by acquiescence cannot involve public land, 
the same policy considerations for claims involving the transfer of private land for public 
use do not apply. In Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 
1995), this Court stated that "[t]he law does not lightly allow the transfer of property 
from private to public use. The public's taking of property in such circumstances as this 
case presents requires proof of dedication by clear and convincing evidence." This same 
concern regarding the transfer of private property to public use does not apply to 
boundary by acquiescence claims and is therefore distinguishable. 
Regarding claims for reformation of a deed, this Court has held that reformation 
"is appropriate where the terms of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not 
4
 See Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
5
 See Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
6
 See Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1984); see also Gray v. Gray, 108 Utah 
388, 160P.2d432. 
1
 See. Raleigh v. Wells, 81 P. 908, 910 (Utah 1905). 
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show the true intent of the agreement between the parties. There are two grounds for 
reformation of such an agreement: mutual mistake of the parties and ignorance or 
mistake by one party, coupled with fraud by the other party." Veibell, 2004 UT at | 36 
(quoting Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984)). These stated grounds 
for reformation of a written instrument justify the application of a higher standard of 
proof as they involve claims of mistake by one or both parties, or claim of fraud against 
one party. These elements, however, are inapplicable to a claim of boundary by 
acquiescence which can only be established through mutual acquiescence in an 
established boundary for a period of at least twenty years. As was noted by the district 
court in this action, "[t]he elements required to reform a deed obviously differ from 
boundary by acquiescence and it is not immediately apparent to the Court why use of the 
same standard of proof in both contexts would be appropriate." Ruling and Order, pg. 
16. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs reliance on the doctrines of prescriptive easements and 
adverse possession are also distinguishable because neither of those doctrines involve 
mutual acquiescence in an accepted boundary. Instead, a claim of adverse possession 
based on parol gift involves the adverse, hostile possession of property contrary to the 
landowner's interest. See_ Raleigh, 81 P. at 910. Similarly, a prescriptive easement arises 
from the use of the servient estate that is open, notorious, and adverse to the landowner's 
interest. See_ Mar chant, 111 P.2d at 682 (citations omitted). This Court, however, has 
characterized boundary by acquiescence claims differently. In Baum v. Defa, this Court 
described the purpose served by boundary by acquiescence as follows: 
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The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives from 
realization, ancient in our law, that the peace and good order 
of society is best served by leaving at rest possible disputes 
over long established boundaries. Its essence is that where 
there has been any type of a recognizable physical boundary, 
which has been accepted as such for a long period of time, it 
should be presumed that any dispute or disagreement over the 
boundary has been reconciled in some manner. 
Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974) (citations omitted). 
Simply put, unlike boundary by acquiescence claims, there is no element of 
"mutual acquiescence" in claims for prescriptive easements and adverse possession 
which indicate reconciliation in some manner or acceptance in a long-established 
boundary. Furthermore, boundary by acquiescence does not require that possession be 
hostile or without permission of the property owner. These very distinctions were the 
basis for the Michigan appellate court's decision in Walters, discussed supra, to reject the 
clear and convincing standard of proof in favor of the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. See. Walters, 570 N.W.2d at 303. For the reasons discussed herein, application 
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is clearly distinguishable from the other 
legal doctrines relied upon by Kay which govern the alteration of real property rights. 
Because the doctrine is distinguishable, this Court should affirm the district court's 
refusal to adopt the clear and convincing standard of proof in boundary by acquiescence 
cases. 
f. Kay has not experienced a taking of his real property rights because, 
pursuant to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, title to the 
parcel of property in dispute had already vested in EBF's 
predecessors-in-interest prior to the time of Kay's purchase of his 
property in 2004. 
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Kay is incorrect in arguing that this case involves a "taking" that divested him of 
his real property rights. See_ Appellant Brief, pg. 8. Clearly, this is not an eminent 
domain action where Kay's property has been taken for a public use, for which he would 
be entitled to compensation under Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. See 
Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Utah 1995). Instead, this action 
involves the establishment of a boundary by acquiescence by Kay's predecessors and 
EBF's predecessors. Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, once the owners 
mutually acquiesce in the boundary line for the requisite twenty-year period, title to the 
property is vested in the owner by operation of law, and title cannot thereafter be 
destroyed by later discovery of the true boundary. See_ Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 31. 
Consistent with this application of the doctrine, the district court concluded that a 
boundary by acquiescence had been established by "the mutual acquiescence of the 
Fowkes and Andrews families prior to Kay's purchase of the property, and that legal title 
to the Disputed Property previously vested in EBF's predecessors-in-interest and has now 
therefore vested in EBF up to the location of the Original Fence." See_ Ruling & Order, 
pg. 25. (R. 413). As the district court noted, the property rights in the Disputed Property 
had already vested in EBF's predecessors-in-interest prior to Kay's purchase of his 
property. In other words, Kay was never the owner of the Disputed Property and never 
had any ownership rights in the property at issue. Instead, Kay received only the 
property rights possessed by Kay's predecessor-in-interest, and Kay's ownership interest 
was accordingly limited to that which was legally conveyed to him. Consequently, 
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because the boundary by acquiescence was established prior to the time in which Kay 
purchased his property in 2004, Kay has not experienced a taking of his property rights. 
II. Even if this Court is persuaded that boundary by acquiescence claims 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence, the district court 
should be affirmed because the district court found that applying the 
clear and convincing standard of proof, EBF was entitled to summary 
judgment on its claim of boundary by acquiescence. 
a. Kay's appeal does not challenge three of the four elements of 
boundary by acquiescence in this action. 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence requires "(1) occupation up to a visible 
line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, (3) for a long period of time, (4) by adjoining land owners." Stoker, 785 P.2d 
at 420. Kay does not argue that EBF has not met the first, third, and fourth elements. See 
Appellant Brief pg. 2, "Issue for review"; see also Appellant Brief pg. 33 ("Mr. Kay 
disputes only the allegation that his predecessors acquiesced in the fence as the boundary. 
The remaining elements are undisputed.") Instead, Kay's appeal concerns whether the 
evidence was sufficient to establish the element of mutual acquiescence. See_ id. 
Specifically, Kay seeks review of whether the evidence was sufficient to find by clear 
and convincing evidence that mutual acquiescence in the boundary established by the 
Original Fence had occurred. For the reasons discussed below, the district court was 
correct in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the element of mutual 
acquiescence was established. 
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b. The district court did not err in finding that the evidence was 
sufficiently compelling to grant EBF summary judgment under the 
clear and convincing standard of proof because the undisputed facts 
confirm that, for over forty years, the parties' predecessors in 
interest mutually acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary 
between the properties. 
Applying the clear and convincing evidence standard, the district court followed 
the formulation employed by the Maine Supreme Court8 which requires boundary by 
acquiescence claims to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See_ Ruling and 
Order, pg. 19 (R. 419). In Anchorage Realty Trust v. Donovan, 880 A.2d 1110 (Me. 
2004), the Maine Supreme Court held that a plaintiff has the burden "to convince a fact-
finder by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., to a high probability, the truth of the 
elements necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence are highly probable." Id. at 
1113 (citation omitted). This was the standard of proof employed by the district court in 
granting EBF summary judgment on its claim of boundary by acquiescence. Kay's 
argument, however, that the district court did not in actuality adhere to this standard of 
proof is unjustified. 
The undisputed testimony of the witnesses in this action confirms that, for over 
forty years, the owners of the two properties and their families all acquiesced in the 
Original Fence as the boundary between the properties. To acquiesce in a boundary line, 
"a landowner must recognize and treat an observable line, such as a fence, as the 
The district court's Ruling and Order stated that Maine's formulation of the clear and 
convincing standard seems consistent with the clear and convincing standard applied by 
the Utah Supreme Court in other areas of law, citing Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust 
Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 78-79, 286 P.2d 1065 (1955) (indicating that clear and convincing 
evidence is evidence which is "very highly probable"). See_ Ruling and Order, pg. 19 (R. 
419). 
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boundary dividing the owner's property from the adjacent landowner's property 
regardless of whether the landowner knows where the actual boundary lies or whether the 
boundary is uncertain." Ault, 2002 UT 33, f 19. Ault further stated that "[t]he 
acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit and inferred from evidence, i.e., the 
landowner's actions with respect to a particular line may evidence the landowner 
impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the demarcation between the properties." 
Id. Furthermore, as noted in Stoker, in '"most cases, the acquiescence is an unconscious 
act with no thought being given during the period of acquiescence to the boundary, let 
alone with surveying it.'" Stoker, 785 P.2d at 422 (quoting Hollidoy v. Guff, 685 P.2d 
500, 509 (Utah 1984) (Howe, J., dissenting)). Once the owners acquiesce in the 
boundary line for the requisite twenty-year period, title to the property is vested in the 
owner by operation of law, and title cannot thereafter be destroyed by later discovery of 
the true boundary. See Veibell, 2004 UT 60,1 31. 
In addition, this Court has stated that "[occupation up to, but never over, the line 
is evidence of acquiescence." Id. at | 25. Furthermore, "[acquiescence may also be 
shown by silence, or the failure of a party to object to a line as a boundary." Id. In 
Veibell, this Court affirmed a judgment of boundary by acquiescence where the evidence 
showed the property owners "farmed up to the fence line since 1938, and they never 
occupied the land south of the fence." Id. at \ 27. The Court further noted that "the 
[owners] never objected to the fence line as the boundary." Id. 
In Stoker, this Court reviewed an order of summary judgment in which the district 
court had "deferred to fence lines as property boundary lines over those established by a 
32 
record title survey." Staker, 785 P.2d at 418. This Court affirmed the district court's 
order of summary judgment, determining that "the undisputed facts establish all of the 
first four requirements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence." Id. at 421. This 
case is on all fours with Staker. In this action, as in Staker, there "is no indication in the 
record that any predecessor in interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent with the belief 
that the fenceline was the boundary." Id. at 420. Moreover, just like in Staker, the 
Andrews family and the Fowkes family "farmed, irrigated, and raised livestock only 
within their respective fenced areas." Id. Finally, as in Staker, there is nothing in the 
record to indicate "that any land owner ever notified his neighbor of a disagreement over 
the true boundary." Id. 
In this action, property owners and witnesses with day-to-day experience from 
both sides of the Original Fence have uniformly testified that they all believed the 
Original Fence was the boundary between the properties. See_ Veibell, 2004 UT 60, % 27 
(relying on testimony of landowner's brother who worked on the farm and who "testified 
that he always believed that the fence was the true boundary"). Vemess Andrews and 
Oral Taylor, prior owners of the EBF Property, have both testified that they believed the 
Original Fence was the boundary between the properties. (R. 93, 124-125, 223-224, 228-
229). In addition, Delos Andrews, who was involved in the family's ranch operations 
from 1971 until the property was sold in 1998, has also testified that there was never a 
dispute about the fence being the boundary between the properties. (R. 104, 114-115, 
225-227). 
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After the Andrews family ceased dry farming their side of the Original Fence after 
six or seven years and began raising cattle, the location of the Original Fence did not 
change. (R. 126, 229-230). The location of the Original Fence was not tied to the 
particular business operations of these families. Instead, the Original Fence was fixture 
on the land that had existed since both families started their respective farming 
operations. These facts refute any suggestion by Kay that the Original Fence may not 
have been intended to be a boundary, but was instead intended to fence in the Andrews' 
livestock. See Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1954) (affirming trial 
court's finding that the fence was not intended as a boundary marker because evidence 
was presented the fence at issue was constructed merely to protect newly planted Box 
Elder trees from sheep grazing in the area). 
On the other side of the Original Fence, the undisputed testimony of Tom Fowkes 
and Dale Fowkes further confirms that the Fowkes family always treated the Original 
Fence as the boundary between the properties, thereby confirming that Kay's 
predecessors in interest had acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary. Tom 
Fowkes, who was bom in 1947, testified that the Original Fence was in existence when 
he was bom. (R. 153, 155, 158, 233, 235). He farmed his family's property from his 
childhood until sometime in the 1970s. (R. 152, 234). Based on his experience working 
on the farm, Tom Fowkes understood the Original Fence to be the boundary between the 
properties. (R. 154, 234). Tom Fowkes further testified that his family maintained the 
Original Fence on occasion. (R. 147, 233). Dale Fowkes also testified that the Original 
Fence was in existence when he was born in 1949. (R. 139, 233). Dale Fowkes 
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conducted farming activities on the family property until the property was sold to Kay. 
(R. 138, 233). Dale Fowkes further confirmed his understanding that the Original Fence 
was the boundary between the properties, and he denied knowledge of any disputes about 
where the boundary was between the two properties. (R. 139, 232-233). 
The testimony of all of these witnesses is consistent with one another, and Kay has 
not presented any witnesses to refute the testimony given. There is simply no evidence of 
any kind to contradict the district court's finding that mutual acquiescence in the 
boundary had occurred, and that a boundary by acquiescence was created. This 
unrefuted testimony from witnesses on both sides of the Original Fence satisfies the clear 
and convincing standard of proof and justifies the district court's finding that the parties' 
predecessors in interest had mutually acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary 
between the properties. 
i. The district court properly relied on the testimony of Tom 
Fowkes and Dale Fowkes in finding that Kay's predecessors had 
acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary between the 
properties. 
Kay argues that the testimony of Tom Fowkes and Dale Fowkes, neither of whom 
were prior owners of the Kay Property, is insufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that Kay's predecessors had acquiesced in the Original Fence as the 
boundary between the properties. This argument rests on the proposition that 
observations of the Fowkes brothers regarding the boundary line, coupled with their 
understanding based on their experience with the property that the Original Fence was 
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always the boundary, is insufficient to show that Kay's predecessors in interest 
"intended" to recognize a visible line, i.e., the Original Fence, as the boundary. 
This precise issue regarding the testimony of non-fee holders was addressed and 
rejected in Veibell. In Veibell, the party opposing the claim of boundary by acquiescence 
argued that there could be no boundary by acquiescence because there was no direct 
evidence from the prior fee holders, both of whom were deceased, that they believed the 
fence at issue to be the boundary. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, | 26. Instead, evidence of the 
recognition of the fence as the boundary was reasonably inferred from the testimony of 
the fee-holder's brother, Bryce Ericksen, who had worked on the farm who testified that 
"he always believed that the fence was the true boundary." Id. at | 27. This reasonable 
inference of acquiescence was further supported by the following facts: 
The Ericksens' actions over the years also indicate that they 
have recognized the fence as a boundary. They have farmed 
up to the fence line since 1938, and they have never occupied 
the land south of the fence. Furthermore, the Ericksens never 
objected to the fence line as the boundary. In light of these 
facts, the trial court's inference of the Ericksens' 
acquiescence is not clearly erroneous. 
Id. 
Based on the foregoing facts, Veibell affirms that acquiescence can be established 
based on the testimony of the relevant family members with knowledge of the property. 
The relevant testimony to be considered is therefore not limited only to fee-holders of the 
property. Furthermore, "because acquiescence may be inferred from the landowner's 
actions, the absence of direct evidence of a prior owner's subjective belief concerning the 
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boundary is not fatal to an assertion of mutual acquiescence." Id, at f 26. "This 
especially holds true where the owner is deceased and unable to testify." Id. 
In the present case, all except one of Kay's prior predecessors in interest is 
deceased. John L. Fowkes died on December 14, 1957. (R. 333, 348). Maud Fowkes 
died on July 9, 1965. (R. 329-331, 348). Blanche F. Cloward died on October 9, 1990. 
(R. 327, 348). Daryl H. Stanley died on July 3, 2005.9 (R. 325, 348). The only living 
predecessor in interest to the Kay Property is Olive Stanley, but she did not participate in 
farming activities on the family property. (R. 150, 155, 235). In any event, there is no 
evidence that Olive Stanley or any of the deceased fee-holders to the Kay Property ever 
took "some action manifesting that they [did] not acquiesce or recognize" the Original 
Fence as the boundary. Ault, 2002 UT 33, f 20. Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
any of Kay's predecessors objected to the treatment of the Original Fence as the 
boundary or to the Andrews family's occupation and use of the property now in dispute. 
Indeed, the undisputed evidence confirms that the Original Fence was always treated as 
the boundary between the properties. Therefore, the district court did not err in accepting 
the testimony of Tom Fowkes and Dale Fowkes, which was not contradicted by any other 
witness, that Kay's predecessors had acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary by 
clear and convincing evidence. The district court's ruling is entirely consistent with 
VeibelL Accordingly, the district court should be affirmed. 
9
 Daryl Stanley died prior to the time in which the parties held their attorneys' planning 
meeting and commenced discovery in the underlying action. See_ Attorneys' Planning 
Meeting Report and [Proposed] Case Management Order (R. 22-25). 
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ii. Utah law does not require evidence of "affirmative" acts to 
establish acquiescence in a boundary. 
As this Court noted in Stoker when it rejected the requirement of "objective 
uncertainty," in "most cases, the acquiescence is an unconscious act with no thought 
being given during the period of acquiescence to the boundary, let alone with surveying 
it." Staker, 785 P.2d at 422 (quoting Halliday, 685 P.2d at 509 (Howe, J., dissenting)). 
Furthermore, "[t]he acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit and inferred from the 
evidence, i.e., the landowner's actions with respect to a particular line may evidence the 
landowner impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the demarcation between the 
properties." Ault, 2002 UT at 1f 19; see also. Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App. 145, f 20, 
24 P.3d 997 (stating that settled case law "clearly provides that acquiescence may be 
established by silence"). 
The case of Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1973) is also instructive in 
explaining that affirmative acts are not necessary to establish a boundary by 
acquiescence. In Lane, this Court affirmed the lower court's judgment which established 
a boundary by acquiescence, explaining that acquiescence did not need to be based on the 
mutual "intent" of the parties: 
[T]he test to establish the boundary by "acquiescence" 
necessarily need not be based on mutual "intent." "Intent" is 
not synonymous with "acquiescence" in these cases. 
"Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with 
"indolence," or "consent by silence[.]" 
Id. at 1200. 
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In a more recent decision, this Court cited Lane, and again noted that 
"acquiescence can consist of indolence or consent by silence." Carter v. Hanrath, 925 
P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 1996). These cases are directly contrary to Kay's argument that 
courts should be required "to look to affirmative acts as the Court of Appeals did" in 
Argyle v. Jones, 2005 UT App. 346, 118 P.3d 301 (Utah Ct App. 2005). See Appellant 
Brief, pg. 28. In Argyle, the appellate court cited Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 
P.2d 257 (1949), in stating that Argyle was required to show more than "inaction" by the 
neighboring owner. Id. at \ 14. Whitney, however, was based on the "objective 
uncertainty" doctrine that was expressly rejected by this Court in Staker. See_ Stoker, 785 
P.2d at 422 (citing Whitney as one of the cases that had adopted the "objective 
uncertainty" requirement). Moreover, Argyle is distinguishable from the present case 
because one of the owners actually knew where the true boundary was located. Argyle, 
2005 UT App. 346, \ 15. There is no similar evidence in this case. 
In any event, Staker is directly on point in confirming that no "affirmative" act is 
necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence. In Staker, the property owners 
farmed and irrigated only within their respective properties, no one acted inconsistently 
with the fence being the boundary, and no one ever objected that the fence was not the 
boundary. Staker, 785 P.2d at 420-21. That is precisely the evidence that exists in this 
case. Therefore, Kay's argument that this Court should require a showing of an 
affirmative act to establish acquiescence in a boundary should be rejected as contrary to 
established precedent in this State. 
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iii. Rather than showing mere occupation up to a line, the district 
court correctly concluded that EBF had established the element 
of mutual acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence. 
On appeal, Kay argues that, without more, mere occupation up to a visible line 
does not prove acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence. See_ Appellant Brief, pg. 
23. EBF recognizes that pursuant to Utah law, the elements of boundary by acquiescence 
include both occupation up to a visible line as well as mutual acquiescence. 
Nevertheless, Kay's argument misses the mark because the evidence at the trial level 
established not only occupation up to the Original Fence, but it also established mutual 
acquiescence in the Original Fence as the boundary between the properties by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
As EBF has previously pointed out, Kay has not contested that the element of 
occupation up to a visible line has been established. Kay's Issue for review instead 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the element of acquiescence. See 
Appellant Brief pg. 2. Indeed, Kay's brief acknowledges that "it is undisputed that Kay's 
predecessors occupied to the fence." Id., at pg. 26. Kay's argument, however, that the 
district court's finding of mutual acquiescence was based on mere occupation is simply 
erroneous. 
In Veibell, this Court stated that "[c]ourts have looked at various landowner 
actions as evidence of acquiescence in a visible line as a boundary. Occupation up to, but 
never over, the line is evidence of acquiescence." Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 25 (citing 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 420-21). It is not the mere fact of occupation up to a visible line that 
serves as evidence of acquiescence, but rather it is occupation up to, but never over, the 
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line that Utah courts will view as evidence of acquiescence. Moreover, in Staker, this 
Court cited the following facts in discussing the element of "mutual acquiescence": 
There is no indication in the record that any predecessor in 
interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent with the belief that 
the fence line was the boundary. Owners occupied houses, 
constructed buildings, farmed, irrigated, and raised livestock 
only within their respective fenced areas. One residence in 
particular, belonging to the Shanes, is built up to a fence line 
and is cut into two parts by the new survey line. This house 
has been standing for over eighty years. Additionally, there is 
no indication that any landowner ever notified his neighbor of 
a disagreement over the true boundary. 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 420-21. 
Significantly, although Staker listed some of these same facts in discussing the 
element of "occupation up to a line," id, at 420, this Court cited these facts again under 
the acquiescence element. Thus, Staker recognized that activities within the fenced areas 
do constitute evidence of mutual acquiescence. Therefore, Kay's argument that the 
"subjective intent" of Kay's predecessor fee owners could not be shown in satisfaction of 
the requirement of mutual acquiescence is incorrect. To the contrary, as in Staker, the 
activities of the parties within the fenced areas constituted evidence of mutual 
acquiescence. All of the witnesses in this case have confirmed that the Fowkes family 
and the Andrews family occupied and farmed their respective properties up to the 
Original Fence, but never over the fence line. Furthermore, consistent with Staker, there 
has been no evidence presented that any of the landowners ever notified his neighbor of a 
disagreement over the true boundary between the properties. Instead, both families 
respected the Original Fence as the boundary between the properties. 
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Contrary to what Kay argues, these factual findings do not constitute a conflation 
of the "occupation" element with the "acquiescence" element. Certainly, circumstances 
exist where adjoining landowners occupy property up to a visible line, yet one of the 
landowners may not acquiesce in the 'Visible line" as the correct boundary. However, 
that is simply not the case here. Instead, the undisputed testimony of the witnesses in this 
case establishes the boundary between the properties was never in dispute and that both 
families regarded the Original Fence as the boundary. Furthermore, the evidence 
confirms that the Fowkes family occupied up to, but never over, the Original Fence. In 
ruling in favor of EBF, the district court properly considered the actions and activities of 
the Fowkes family and the Andrews family which confirmed the element of mutual 
acquiescence had been met by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the district 
court should be affirmed. 
III. Kay has not properly preserved his arguments regarding the law of 
abandonment of easements on appeal and, even if this Court were to 
consider the arguments now raised for the first time by Kay, the law of 
abandonment of easements is distinguishable from the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. 
a. Kay's arguments regarding the law of abandonment of easements 
was never raised before the trial court and cannot now be raised for 
the first time on appeal. 
On appeal, Kay argues for the first time that the standards governing the 
abandonment of easements should be applied by this Court in settling the present claim of 
boundary by acquiescence. This theory, however, was never raised before the trial court 
and cannot now be raised on appeal. This Court has held that "'as a general rule, claims 
not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."' State v. Cram, 2002 UT 
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37, | 9, 46 P.3d 230, 232 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. This 
preservation rule "applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a 
defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Cram, 46 P.3d at 232 (quoting Holgate, 10 P.3d at 350). This Court has 
previously held that "[ojrderly procedure requires that a party must present his entire case 
and his theory or theories to the trial court, and he cannot thereafter urge a different 
theory in an attempt to prolong litigation." Clegg v. Lee, 516 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973). 
Furthermore, a party's failure "to argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that 
forum denies the trial court the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law pertinent to the claimed error." State v. Richins, 2004 UT App. 36, | 8, 86 P.3d 759 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Kay has not argued plain error by the trial court in failing to consider arguments 
pertaining to the abandonment of easements. In addition, Kay has not argued that there 
were exceptional circumstances that prevented the trial court from considering arguments 
related to the abandonment of easements in deciding this property dispute. Instead, this is 
merely a case in which Kay failed to advance an argument at the trial level which he now 
wishes to raise for the first time on appeal. Because Kay's arguments concerning the 
abandonment of easements have not been preserved on appeal, this Court should decline 
to consider Kay's arguments regarding the abandonment of easements. 
b. The law of abandonment of easements is distinguishable from 
boundary by acquiescence claims and is therefore inapplicable to 
the present appeal. 
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As EBF has noted above, Kay is barred from raising arguments for the first time 
regarding the law of abandonment of easements on appeal which were never raised at the 
trial level. However, even if this Court is willing to consider the merits of these new 
arguments, Kay's argument is unavailing. Specifically, Kay argues that this Court should 
apply the same standard of proof and analysis in boundary by acquiescence cases that it 
applies in cases involving the abandonment of easements. See Appellant Brief, pgs. 29-
32. The case of Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder sets forth the elements of a 
claim for abandonment of an easement: 
It is well recognized that an easement or right of way may be 
abandoned. However, to determine the issue of abandonment 
several factors need be considered among which are whether 
or not the right was acquired by prescription or grant, the 
extent of its use, and the actual intent of the owner. This 
court has previously recognized that a right gained by 
conveyance may not be lost by non-use alone and that an 
actual intent to abandon be evident. 
*** 
In regard to the quantum of proof required on the issue of 
abandonment, . . . the degree of proof required [is] that of 
clear and convincing actions releasing the ownership and 
right of use and an intentional abandonment, not a mere 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Teseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 
1977) (internal citations omitted). 
Relying on the law of abandonment of easements, Kay urges this Court to apply 
the same considerations in deciding boundary by acquiescence claims. See_ Appellant 
Brief pg. 31. First, Kay argues that "mere non-use of an easement is insufficient to 
divest the owner of the dominant estate of his easement." Id. By analogy, Kay argues 
that, in boundary by acquiescence cases, "mere occupation of one's property by another 
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is not sufficient to divest her of her fee title." Id. EBF does not take issue with this 
particular analogy. Clearly, occupation up to a visible line is only one of the necessary 
elements of a boundary by acquiescence claim. Significantly, the issue of parties' 
respective occupation up to the Original Fence is not contested by Kay. See_ Appellant 
Brief, pg. 33. 
Kay also argues that since evidence of intent to abandon an easement is required, 
the same degree of evidence should be required in boundary by acquiescence cases. Id., 
at pg. 31-32. This argument goes hand in hand with Kay's argument that the Court 
should require clear and convincing proof in boundary by acquiescence cases because 
clear and convincing proof is required in abandonment of easement cases. Id., at pg. 32. 
Regarding the burden of proof required in boundary by acquiescence cases, Kay's 
argument should be rejected because, as has already been addressed herein, this Court has 
already held that boundary by acquiescence claims are established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. See Elias v. Lea, 1978 Utah LEXIS 1129,12. 
Furthermore, with respect to the requirement of acquiescence in a boundary, this 
Court has held that "[c]ourts have looked at various landowner actions as evidence of 
acquiescence in a visible line as a boundary. Occupation up to, but never over, the line is 
evidence of acquiescence." Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 25 (citing Staker, 785 P.2d at 420-
21). For the purposes of boundary by acquiescence claims, such evidence is sufficient to 
establish acquiescence. Moreover, this Court has clearly stated that, in boundary by 
acquiescence cases, "intent" is not synonymous with "acquiescence," and acquiescence 
does not necessarily need to be based on mutual "intent." Lane, 505 P.2d at 1200. 
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Therefore, to the extent that Kay advocates a different interpretation of what constitutes 
evidence of acquiescence, Kay's argument is inconsistent with established Utah 
precedent and should be rejected. 
Lastly, Kay argues that evidence of "affirmative acts55 are required to prove the 
element of acquiescence. See_ Appellant Brief, pg. 32. Notably, however, Kay5s 
inclusion of this requirement in the context of his discussion of abandonment of easement 
cases is questionable at best because none of the abandonment of easement cases cited by 
Kay in his brief include "affirmative acts55 as a necessary element of the claim.10 In any 
event, as EBF has already argued in this brief, Utah courts do not require evidence of 
"affirmative acts55 to establish acquiescence in a boundary. For example, in Carter, this 
Court stated that "acquiescence can consist of indolence or consent by silence.55 Carter, 
925 P.2d at 962. In addition, Stoker is directly on point in confirming that no 
"affirmative55 act is necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence. In Stoker, as in 
this action, the parties farmed only within their respective boundaries, no one acted 
inconsistently with the fence being the boundary, and no one ever objected that the fence 
was not the boundary. Stoker, 875 P.2d at 420-21. These cases stand in clear opposition 
JU
 Kay cites Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 Utah 257, 265, 102 P. 740, 742 
(1909) (citations omitted), which states: "An easement may be extinguished by an act of 
the owner of the easement which is incompatible with the existence of the right claimed. 
If the owner of the easement himself obstructs it in a manner inconsistent with its further 
enjoyment, or permits the owner of the servient estate to do so, the easement will be 
considered abandoned.55 Significantly, there is no requirement that abandonment be 
established through the "affirmative act55 of the owner of the dominant estate. While an 
affirmative act of the owner of the dominant estate may in fact establish an intent to 
abandon the easement, Brown also contemplates that abandonment of an easement may 
be established by permitting the owner of the servient estate to obstruct the easement. 
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to Kay's argument that a showing of an affirmative act is necessary to establish 
acquiescence in a boundary. 
As shown herein, Utah cases governing boundary by acquiescence claims are 
distinguishable from claims involving the abandonment of easements. Accordingly, 
Kay's argument which seeks to apply the rules governing abandonment of easement 
claims to boundary by acquiescence actions is contrary to Utah precedent and should be 
rejected by this Court. 
IV. The district court did not err in denying Kay's cross motion for partial 
summary judgment. 
The Issues for Review identified by Kay in his appellate brief do not allege that 
the district court committed reversible error in denying his cross motion for summary 
judgment.11 See. Appellant Brief, pg. 2. Nevertheless, Kay's concludes his brief by 
asking this Court to reverse the judgment entered in favor of EBF and "order summary 
judgment be entered in favor of Mr. Kay and against Appellee." Id, at pg. 40. At the 
trial level, Kay's cross motion requested partial summary judgment decreeing that EBF 
did not have a claim on the property in dispute under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence. (R. 260-261). 
Section 5 of Kay's appellate brief contains the following heading: "The Trial 
Court Erred in Denying Kay's Motion and Granting EBF's Motion for Summary 
Judgment." Id., at pg. 32. This section is devoted to revisiting arguments Kay already 
11
 It should be noted that although the document at issue was captioned "Defendant 
Steven L. Kay's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment," Kay in actuality moved for 
partial summary judgment, seeking a decree that EBF has no claim upon the property in 
dispute under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. (R. 260-261). 
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raised earlier in his brief which challenge the district court's entry of summary judgment 
in favor of EBF. Id, pgs. 32-39. Kay again erroneously contends that the district court's 
finding of mutual acquiescence was based only on the fact of mere occupation up to the 
Original Fence. Id, pg. 39. Furthermore, Kay again challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that a boundary by acquiescence had 
been established by clear and convincing evidence, but Kay does not raise any new 
arguments. Id, pgs. 37-38. 
EBF has already addressed these arguments at length herein and does not see any 
purpose served in repeating those same arguments again. In sum, the undisputed 
evidence was sufficient to find by clear and convincing evidence that a boundary by 
acquiescence was established. EBF therefore requests that this Court affirm the district 
court's summary judgment ruling in its favor, and also affirm the denial of Kay's cross 
motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not err in ruling that claims of boundary by acquiescence are 
correctly decided under a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. Furthermore, 
even if this Court is persuaded that boundary by acquiescence claims require proof by 
clear and convincing evidence, the district court should nevertheless be affirmed. In 
ruling in favor of EBF, the district court applied the clear and convincing standard of 
proof, finding that each of the elements of boundary by acquiescence had been met by 
EBF. The district court's ruling was supported by the evidence and should therefore be 
48 
affirmed. Furthermore, because summary judgment was properly granted in favor of 
EBF, the district court did not err in denying Kay's cross motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this ~7 day of May, 2010. 
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J. Morrow Elias, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Lea and Laura Lea, Defen-
dants, Counter Claimants, Third-Party Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. J. Morrow 
Elias, and Mrs. J. Morrow Elias, Third-Party Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 14885 
Supreme Court of Utah 
1978 Utah LEXIS 1129 
February 7,1978, Filed 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Real Property Law > Adjoining Landowners > Boun-
daries 
Real Property Law > Title Quality > Adverse Claim 
Actions > General Overview 
[HN1] The very presumptions of acquiescence relied 
upon do not apply until the following elements are estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) Occupa-
tion up to a visible line marked definitely by some mo-
nument, (2) acquiescence in that line as a boundary (a) 
by adjoining land owners, and (b) for a long period of 
time. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Substantial Evidence > General Overview 
[HN2] The court does not substitute its judgment of what 
the facts are unless the ruling of the court below is clear-
ly against the weight of the evidence. 
COUNSEL: [*1] John H. Allen for plaintiffs and 
respondent. 
James F. Hausley for defendants and appellants. 
John H. Allen for third-party defendants and respon-
dents. 
JUDGES: ELLETT, Chief Justice, wrote the opinion. I 
CONCUR: J. Allan Crockett, Justice. HENRIOD, Re-
tired Justice: (Concurring). WILKINS, Justice: (Dis-
senting). Maughan, Justice, concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Wilkins. 
Hall, Justice, having disqualified himself does not par-
ticipate herein; Henriod, Retired Justice, sat. 
OPINION BY: ELLETT 
OPINION 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: Mr. and Mrs. Lea appeal 
from a judgment entered by the trial court quieting title 
to a twenty-eight foot strip of land in Mr. Elias who was 
the record owner thereof. The parties are adjoining 
landowners and their deeds call for a common boundary 
line to the east of a fence which has had a varied exis-
tence since it was erected. 
The trial court refused to quiet title in Mr. and Mrs. 
Lea on their claim of boundary by acquiesence, and they 
now bring this appeal. 
There is nothing in the record to show that any 
agreement ever existed between the owners of the two 
tracts of land to the effect that the fence was the true 
boundary [*2] between the parcels. Nor was there any 
evidence to indicate that the fence was intended to be a 
dividing line since it was originally erected by the com-
mon owner of the two parcels of land. 
In 1954, when the predecessor in interest of the res-
pondent purchased the land, there existed only two stubs 
of posts in what had originally been a fence built by the 
owner of both pieces of property for his own purposes. 
Thereafter, a wooden fence was erected, but the family 
of the respondent had access to his property on both 
sides thereof; never at any time did he consent to having 
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the fence as the eastern boundary of his land. In 1973, 
when a chain link fence was erected which deprived the 
respondent and his family of access to their property to 
the east, this lawsuit was initiated. 
The appellants would have us reverse the trial court 
in presumptions which more nearly indicate adverse 
possession than they do acquiesence. [HN1] The very 
presumptions relied upon do not apply until the follow-
ing elements are established by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely 
by some monument, 
(2) Acquiesence in that line as a boundary 
(a) by adjoining [*3] land owners, and 
(b) for a long period of time. 
Appellants have failed in their proof of acquiesence 
in the fence as a boundary. As pointed out in the case of 
Riter v. Cayias, n. 1 the party losing the property must 
have knowledge that his property is being claimed by 
another. There is no proof that the respondent or any of 
his predecessors in interest ever had any knowledge that 
the property east of the fence was being claimed by 
another. This statement is bolstered by the finding of 
the trial court, towit: 
3. At the time that defendants received the con-
veyance referred to in the previous paragraph, a fence 
existed along a line going generally north and south ap-
proximately nine feet west of what is now the east line of 
Lot 5, Millbrook Terrace Subdivision, said line being 
close to the line on which a chain link fence erected by 
defendants in 1973, now exists. Neither plaintiff and 
third-party defendants J. Morrow Elias and Susan Lynn 
Elias, nor their predecessors in title have acquiesced in 
said line as a boundary. 
The appellants urge us to overlook the finding of the 
trial court who saw and heard the witnesses and render 
our own findings at variance therewith. [*4] They 
urge us to do so because of the provisions of Article VIII, 
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution which so far as ma-
terial, reads as follows: 
...In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of 
both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on 
questions of law alone.... 
At the time the Constitution was adopted, equity 
matters were submitted on depositions; therefore, mem-
bers of the Supreme Court were just as capable of deter-
mining the facts in an equity case as was the trial judge. 
By our court decision we have continued to consider the 
facts of an equity case on appeal, but [HN2] we do not 
substitute our judgment of what the facts are unless the 
ruling of the court below is clearly against the weight of 
the evidence. 
In the instant matter, the ruling of the trial court was 
based on proper, competent evidence and it is hereby 
affirmed. Costs are awarded to the respondent. 
I CONCUR: J. Allan Crockett, Justice 
CONCUR BY: HENRJOD 
CONCUR 
HENRIOD, Retired Justice: (Concurring) I concur 
in the conclusion reached by Mr. Chief Justice Ellett in 
the main opinion. Both parties claimed title through 
Wooley Company. That company owned both tracts, 
whence the fence possibly [*5] could not have been a 
boundary. This fence was burned a time or two, but fire 
had nothing much to do with who thought was or was not 
done to the title. To reject the trial court's conclusion 
quieting title, in my opinion is not compelling on the 
facts here, irrespective of the threadbare Constitutional 
admonition (Art. VIII, Sec. 9) about reviewing the facts 
as well as the law, - a practical bit of legerdemain em-
ployed for convenience. Stanley v Stanley, is a manly 
primer, but withal the cases to date, the rule seems to 
have been laid down that on appellate review, the trial 
court's decision will be affirmed if there is substantial, 
competent, admissible evidence to support it, - whether it 
be the collective confusion of the jury, or the isolated, 
appealed and therefore disputed interdiction of the court, 
- be it that the Chancellor or that of the Common Pleas. 
I believe that the record cannot stand the test of boundary 
by acquiesence under the authorities ably collected in an 
article pertinent to this problem, published in 3 Utah Law 
Review, 1953, and cases following which easily may be 
Shepardized and need no citation here, save by reference. 
DISSENT BY: WILKINS 
DISSENT 
WILKINS, 
[*6] WILKINS, Justice: (Dissenting) I respectful-
ly dissent. In 1932, when the defendants took posses-
sion of their tract of land, there existed a barbed wire 
fence running essentially parallel to and approximately 
28 feet west of the boundary as described in the plain-
tiffs deed. (The description of plaintiffs tract overlapped 
that described in defendant's deed by more than 8 feet.) 
There was no evidence as to who built the fence, when 
it was built or the purpose for which it was built. This 
original fence remained intact until it was burned in 1954 
except for several intervals prior thereto during which 
the wires were down. Defendant James Lea repaired the 
fence after each such interval, and he rebuilt the barbed 
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wire fence after the fire in 1954, later replacing the 
barbed wire fence with a wooden fence, and finally 
erecting a chainlink fence in 1973. The majority opi-
nion relies in part on the fact that plaintiff and his wife 
had access to both sides of the fence, but Mrs. Elias testi-
fied that it was necessary to remove the wooden slats to 
have access to the other side, and only small animals 
such as chickens could get through the fence without 
removal of the slats. 
From [*7] 1932 until the time of trial, defendants 
occupied the property east of the fence and plaintiff and 
his predecessors occupied the property west of the fence. 
Plaintiffs predecessors in title did not claim the property 
east of the fence until 1954, when one of them, F. Grant 
Woodward, asserted ownership. Woodward threatened, 
but did not file suit to quiet title. No further claims were 
asserted for another 19 years, until the plaintiff instituted 
the present suit to quiet title, and for all that time, the 
fence remained in the same position. 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence was 
originally an extension of the boundary by agreement 
doctrine. The latter doctrine allows adjoining land 
owners to establish a boundary line by oral agreement 
where the true line is unknown, uncertain, or in dispute. 
Where there is no proof of an actual agreement, boun-
dary by acquiescence applies, and ignorance, uncertainty 
or dispute as to the true line and an agreement as to the 
boundary will be presumed ] if the following elements 
are established: (1) occupation up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences or buildings and (2) ac-
quiescence in the line as the boundary (3) for a long pe-
riod [*8] of years and (4) by adjoining landowners.2 
1 Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 
2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973). 
2 Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 
143 (1964). See also the second appeal of that 
case, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966). 
It is the second element, acquiescence in the line as 
the boundary, which the District Court found was not 
established. 
The term "acquiescence" was defined by this Court 
in Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199, 
1200 (1973): 
...the test to establish the boundary by "acquies-
cence" mecessarily need not be based on mutual "intent." 
"Intent" is not synonymous with "acquiescence" in these 
cases. "Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with 
"indolence," or "consent by silence," - or a knowledge 
that a fence or other monuments appear to be a boundary, 
- but that no one did anything about it for 48 years.... 
The test articulated above contains three elements: 
(1) knowledge (2) of an apparent boundary (3) and a 
failure to act in the face [*9] of such knowledge. 
The first requirement in the Lane test for acquies-
cence is knowledge of the apparent boundary. The evi-
dence shows that the fence was visible for the entire pe-
riod of 1932 to 1954 at which time it burned. There is 
some conflict in the evidence as to the date it was re-
placed by defendants, but it is clear it was rebuilt by 
1958, and that since 1954, the posts of the old fence re-
mained. Defendants' use of the property up to the fence 
line was also open to observation by the plaintiffs pre-
decessors. It is clear, therefore, that plaintiffs predeces-
sors knew of the fence and defendants' use of the prop-
erty. 
The second requirement in the Lane test is that 
there be an apparent boundary. Here, the use of the land 
by defendants up to the fence, coupled with the lack of 
use beyond the fence by plaintiffs predecessors, is an 
indication that the fence was a dividing line. Also, here, 
the fence unlike the irrigation ditch found not to be a 
boundary in Fuoco v. Williams, supra, note 2, was visi-
ble, permanent, and had a definite location and further 
had no purpose other than as a boundary.3 
3 Even if the fence were built by the common 
grantor for purposes other than boundary, this 
would not prevent the fence from operating as a 
boundary once the property is conveyed to sepa-
rate owners. Baum v. Defa, Utah, 525 P.2d 725 
(1974). 
[*10] The final element in the acquiescence test is 
a failure to act. In 1954 Woodward asserted a claim 
against the property west of the fence line, but did noth-
ing to clear title to the property. Thereafter, the disputed 
area was conveyed by plaintiffs predecessors only by 
quit claim deeds, though warranty deeds were used to 
convey the rest of plaintiffs property. As of 1954 the 
fence had been in existence for over 22 years and at that 
time the boundary was already established. There fol-
lowed an additional 19 years during which all of the 
plaintiffs and their predecessors acquiesced in the fence 
as a boundary, and none of them took action to assert 
their claims. The fence has now been in the same place 
for 41 years, and this Court should confirm title to the 
disputed area in the defendants who have used it for all 
of that period of time. 
Maughan, Justice, concurs in the views expressed in 
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Wilkins. 
Hall, Justice, having disqualified himself does not 
participate herein; Henriod, Retired Justice, sat. 
